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Abstract
A long outstanding problem for abduction in logic programming has been on how minimality
might be defined. Without minimality, an abductive procedure is often required to generate
exponentially many subsumed explanations for a given observation. In this paper, we propose a
new definition of abduction in logic programming where the set of minimal explanations can be
viewed as a succinct representation of the set of all explanations. We then propose an abductive
procedure where the problem of generating explanations is formalized as rewriting with confluent
and terminating rewrite systems. We show that these rewrite systems are sound and complete under
the partial stable model semantics, and sound and complete under the answer set semantics when
the underlying program is so-called odd-loop free. We discuss an application of abduction in logic
programming to a problem in reasoning about actions and provide some experimental results.
 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Abductive reasoning subscribes to reasoning processes where explanatory hypotheses
are formed and evaluated with respect to a knowledge base and an observation. Many
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intelligent tasks, including medical diagnosis, fault diagnosis, scientific discovery, legal
reasoning, and natural language understanding, have been characterized as abduction.
In its most general form, the problem of abduction is this: given a background theory
T and an observation q to explain, find an explanation theory Π such that Π ∪ T |= q .
Normally, we also want to put some additional conditions on Π , such as that it is
consistent with T and contains only those propositions called abducibles. For instance,
in propositional logic, given a background theory T , a set A of assumptions or abducibles,
and a proposition q , an explanation S of q is commonly defined (see [18,28,30]) to be a
minimal set of literals over A such that T ∪ S |= q and T ∪ S is consistent.
Abductive reasoning may be carried out in non-classic logics as well. Logic program-
ming with stable models or answer sets as the underlying semantics has been considered
particularly appealing for abduction, due to its applications in solving constraint satisfac-
tion and other combinatorial problems, in expressing the frame axioms, in reasoning with
actions and causality, and in representing the history of a plan [21,26,27].
In the context of logic programming, abduction has been investigated from both
proof-theoretic and model-theoretic perspectives (e.g., [7,14–16,34]). One of the most
followed definitions of abduction in logic programming is that of Kakas and Mancarella’s
generalized stable model semantics [15]. Given a logic program P , a set A of atoms
standing for abducibles, and a query q , Kakas and Mancarella defined an abductive
explanation S to be a subset of A such that there is an answer set (also called a stable
model) of P ∪ S that satisfies q .
One can see the following two differences between this definition and the one that we
defined above for propositional logic: In propositional logic, S is a set of literals, but in
logic programming, it is just a set of atoms; In propositional logic, S must be minimal, in
terms of the subset ordering relation; but there is no such requirement in the case of logic
programming.
One could argue that these differences are due to the fact that under the answer set
semantics, negation is considered to be “negation-as-failure”. If none of the atoms in A
appear in the head of a rule in the logic program P , then adding a set S ⊆ A to P really
means that we are adding the complete literal set, S ∪ {¬p | p ∈ A,p /∈ S}, to P . This
would also explain why there is no minimality condition in the definition: two complete
sets of literals are never comparable in terms of the subset relation.
However, while this notion of abductive explanations makes sense in theory, it is
problematic in practice. For instance, if A= {a, b}, and P = {q← a. r← b.}, then there
are two abductive explanations for q according to Kakas and Mancarella’s definition: {a}
and {a, b}. In general, if A has n elements, then there are 2n−1 abductive explanations for
q , and in these exponentially many explanations, only a is relevant.
Since in this case a is the explanation that we are looking for, it is tempting here to say
that we should prefer minimal abductive explanations like what we did for propositional
logic. As we mentioned above, this does not make sense if we take an abductive explanation
to be a complete set of literals as implied by the answer set semantics. However, one can
still try to minimize the set of atoms, in this case, preferring {a} over {a, b}.
However, this minimization strategy is problematic when a program contains negation.
Consider a situation in which a boat can be used to cross a river if it is not leaking or, if
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it is leaking, there is a bucket available to scoop the water out of the boat. This can be
axiomatized by the following logic program P :
canCross← boat,not leaking.
canCross← boat, leaking,hasBucket.
Now suppose that we saw someone crossed the river, how do we explain that? Clearly, there
are two possible explanations: either the boat is not leaking or the person has a bucket with
her. In terms of Kakas and Mancarella’s definition, there are three abductive explanations
for canCross, {boat}, {boat,hasBucket}, and {boat, leaking,hasBucket}, assuming that
A = {boat, leaking,hasBucket} is the set of abducibles. But only one of them, {boat}, is
minimal.
On a closer look, we see that in our first example, when we say that {a} is a preferred
explanation over all the others, we do not mean the complete set of literals {a,¬b}, is
preferred over all the others. While we want a to be part of the explanation, we don’t
necessarily want ¬b because we do not want to apply negation as failure on abducibles,
which are assumptions one can make one way or the other. What we want is for the set {a}
itself to be the best explanation for q .
One way to justify this is that all possible ways of completing this set into a complete set
of literals, {a,¬b} and {a, b}, turn out to correspond to all the abductive explanations of q
according to Kakas and Mancarella’s definition. The same kind of justification turns out to
work for our second example as well: the reason that {boat} is not a preferred explanation
is that while its completion according to negation-as-failure, {boat,¬leaking,¬hasBucket}
is an explanation, some of its other completions, for example {boat, leaking,¬hasBucket}
is not an explanation. This simple observation that for a set of literals to be an explanation,
all of its possible extensions must also be an explanation will be the basis for our new
definition of abduction in logic programming, given in Section 3.
With a new definition of abductive explanations in hands, we next address the compu-
tational problem of how to generate these explanations. To simplify our presentation, in
Section 4, we shall consider first the special case when the set of abducibles is empty. In
this case, abduction becomes query answering. Briefly speaking, given a logic program,
we introduce a rewrite system consisting of its Clark completion as rewrite rules for literal
rewriting, and formula transformations as simplification rules, along with two loop rules to
handle loops. It turns out that rewriting by a rewrite system of this kind always terminates
at a unique formula, independent of any order of rewriting. In the literature of rewrite sys-
tems (see, e.g., [5,13]), this latter property is called the confluence property, and confluent
and terminating systems are called canonical systems. A canonical system guarantees the
termination at a unique expression independent of the order of rewriting. It is interesting
to remark here that we could implement a form of nonmonotonic reasoning by a rewriting
system, the two areas of research that had little connection previously. We show that these
rewrite systems are sound and complete under the partial stable model semantics, in the
sense that for any query, if it is written into True, then there must be a partial stable model
containing this query, and if it is written into False, then there cannot be any partial stable
model containing it. Since stable models are special cases of partial stable models, this
means that if a query is written into False, there cannot be any stable model containing it.
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However, if it is written into True, in general, it could still happen that there may not be any
stable model containing it. But our rewrite systems are of such nature that when a query
is written into True, there will be a context, which is a set of literals, associated with the
rewriting. To see whether there will be a stable model containing this query, one then only
has to check whether this context can be extended to a stable model, a task that is normally
much easier than finding a stable model from scratch. There is a special case, however,
when the given propositional logic program is finite and so-called odd-loop free. For these
programs, partial stable models coincide with stable models. Thus our rewrite systems are
also sound and complete for these programs.
Then in Section 5, we extend the system to logic programs with abducibles, and again
show that it is sound and complete under the partial stable model semantics. Again this
implies that for any query, if a program is odd-loop free, the rewriting system generates a
set of explanations that “covers” all possible explanations of the query. In the general case,
the rewriting system generates an approximation of such a cover. Section 6 compares our
rewriting system with other abductive procedures. In particular, we will see why SLDNF-
like procedures cannot be adopted in a simple way for the kind of answer set programming
advocated in this paper. The rewriting system presented in this paper has been implemented
in Prolog. In Section 7 we discuss an application of our system to reasoning about actions
and present some experimental results using our Prolog implementation.
Although our technical development is based on propositional programs, we will
comment on how our rewriting framework can be used for classes of function-free
programs for proving ground goals. One such class is the so-called domain restricted
programs [27]. This material is given in Section 4.4.
2. Logic programming semantics
Here, we consider (normal) logic programs which are sets of rules of the form
a← b1, . . . , bm,notc1, . . . ,notcn
where m,n 0, and a, bi and ci are atoms of a underlying propositional languageL. Here
an atom with “not ” in front is called a default negation. As usual, a is called the head of
the rule and the rest the body of the rule. For clarity of presentation, we may place a period
at the end of a rule.
We sometimes write a rule of the above form as
a←D,not_C
where D denotes the set of positive literals in the rule and not_C the set of default
negations. Given such D and not_C, we use the notation, ¬D = {¬φ | φ ∈ D} and
C = {φ | notφ ∈ not_C}.
We sometimes also write a rule as a ← B , with B denoting the body of the rule. In
this case, for convenience, we may also write B in a formula, as in the case of computing
the Clark completion of a program, which will then stand for the conjunction of all the
literals in B with the default negation not replaced by the negation operator “¬” in our
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propositional language. When no confusion arises, the word literal may refer to a classic
literal as well as a default negation.
In this paper, we mainly deal with three semantics: the completion semantics [2], the
stable model semantics [10], and the partial stable model semantics [29]. The stable model
semantics has been generalized to the answer set semantics [11]. For the class of normal
logic programs, which is the one considered in this paper, the two terminologies are
interchangeable.
Given a propositional program P , the Clark completion of P , denoted Comp(P ), is the
following set of equivalences: for each atom φ ∈ L,
• if φ does not appear as the head of any rule in P , φ↔ F ∈ Comp(P ) (F stands for
falsity here);
• otherwise, φ↔ B1∨· · ·∨Bn ∈ Comp(P ) (with default negations replaced by negative
literals), if there are exactly n rules φ ← Bi ∈ P with φ as the head. We write T
(tautology) for Bi if Bi is empty.
We now proceed to define partial stable models, which are originally defined in [29]
under 3-valued logic. It is known that they can be defined equivalently in a number of
different ways. Here, we adopt the definition given in [37] that does not rely on 3-valued
logic (which will be introduced briefly at the end of this section).
We define some notations. Let E be a set of (classic) literals (or E may be a conjunction
of literals in syntax). E+ and E− denote the subsets of positive literals and negative literals
in E, respectively, and EN = {notφ | ¬φ ∈E}.
Let P be a program and ξ denote a proposition. For any set S of default negations, let
FP (S)= {notξ | P ∪ S  ξ}
where  is the standard propositional derivation relation with each default negation notφ
being treated as a named atom not_φ. It is easy to check that the function that applies FP
twice, denoted F 2P , is monotonic: S1 ⊆ S2 implies F 2P (S1)⊆ F 2P (S2).
A set of literals M is a partial stable model of P iff it satisfies F 2P (MN ) = MN ,
MN ⊆ FP (MN ), and M+ = {ξ | P ∪ MN  ξ}. Any atom ξ such that ξ /∈ M and
¬ξ /∈M represents that ξ is undefined in M . The conditionMN ⊆ FP (MN ) is to guarantee
consistency. For example, with P = {p← notq. q← notp.}, the set of default negations
S = {notp,notq} satisfies F 2P (S)= S, but not S ⊆ FP (S).
Let M be a partial stable model. M+ is called an answer set (or a stable model) iff
FP (M
N )=MN .
In general, a program may not have any answer sets. For instance, if P = {p ←
notp. q ←}, then P has no answer set, because there is no way to assign the values
true or false to p. However, P has a partial stable model, M = {q}, in which q is true
and p is undefined. This can be seen as follows (note that MN = ∅): FP (MN )= {notp},
FP ({notp})=MN , MN ⊆ FP (MN ), and M+ = {ξ | P ∪MN  ξ}.
As our discussion sometimes refers to 3-valued logic, it is convenient to introduce it
here briefly. This material may be skipped if the reader is not going to read the proofs of
the soundness and completeness theorems.
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In 3-valued logic [17], there are three truth values: true, false, and undefined, denoted
t , f , and u respectively. An interpretation I is a consistent set of literals: for any atom φ
in the underlying language L, φ is true in I if φ ∈ I , φ is false in I if ¬φ ∈ I , and φ is
undefined otherwise. The order of the truth values is defined as: f < u< t . The connective
¬ (as well as not ) is defined as: ¬t = f (not t = f ), ¬f = t (notf = t), and ¬u = u
(notu= u). The truth value of a conjunction is defined as the minimum value among the
truth values of literals in the conjunction whereas the truth value of a disjunction is defined
as the maximum value of the literals in the disjunction. The truth value of an implication
A← B is t if the truth value of A is greater than or equal to that of B , otherwise it is f .
Logic equivalence is defined as: A↔ B iff (A→ B)∧ (B→A).
We say that a 3-valued interpretation I satisfies a formula if the truth value of the
formula is t in I . Thus a program rule a ← B is satisfied by a 3-valued interpretation
I if it is satisfied as an implication. A model of a program is an interpretation in which all
the program rules are satisfied. We will use I (Q) to denote the truth valuation of formula
Q under 3-valued interpretation I . A 3-valued interpretation I reduces to a 2-valued
interpretation if for every atom φ ∈ L, either φ ∈ I or ¬φ ∈ I . As usual, we use a set
of atoms to denote a 2-valued interpretation.
3. Abduction in logic programming revisited
In this section, we present a new definition of abduction in logic programming based
on the answer set semantics. Let P be a logic program, A a set of propositions standing
for abducibles, and q a proposition. In the following, without loss of generality, we shall
assume that none of the abducibles in A occur in the head of a rule in P .1
In the following, by a hypothesis α we mean a consistent set of literals over A, i.e., it
is not the case that p and ¬p are both in α for some p ∈ A. We say that a hypothesis
is complete if for each atom p ∈ A, either p or ¬p is in α, but not both. Notice that a
complete hypothesis is really a truth-value assignment over the language A. We say that a
hypothesis α is an extension of another one β if β ⊆ α, and a complete extension if it is an
extension that is complete.
Definition 3.1. A complete hypothesis α is said to be an explanation of q with respect to P
and A iff there is an answer set M of P ∪ α+ such that M contains q and for any ¬p ∈ α,
p /∈M , where α+ is the set of atoms in α.
Definition 3.2. A hypothesis is said to be an explanation of q iff every complete extension
of it is an explanation. A hypothesis α is said to be a minimal explanation if it is an
explanation, and there is no other explanation α′ such that α′ ⊂ α.
Consider the logic program P in Section 1 about canCross. The following are the
complete hypotheses that explain canCross:
1 If p ∈ A occurs in the head of a rule, then we can always introduce a new proposition, say p′, add the rule
p← p′ to P , add p′ to A and delete p from A.
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{boat,¬leaking,¬hasBucket},
{boat,¬leaking,hasBucket}, {boat, leaking,hasBucket}.
Now consider {boat,hasBucket}. Clearly every complete extension of this set is an
explanation, so it is an explanation as well. Furthermore, it is a minimal explanation
as none of its element can be deleted for it continue to be an explanation. Similarly,
{boat,¬leaking} is also a minimal explanation.










where S1 is the set of all complete hypotheses that are explanations of q , S2 the set of all
explanations of q , and S3 the set of all minimal explanations of q . Therefore the set of
minimal explanations is a succinct representation of the set of all explanations.
It is clear from our definition that a complete hypothesis α is an explanation of q iff
α+ is an abductive explanation of q according to Kakas and Mancarella’s definition. This






where S1 is the set of all abductive explanation of q according to Kakas and Mancarella’s
definition, cl(S) = S ∪ {¬p | p ∈ A,p /∈ S}, and S2 is the set of all minimal explanations
of q .
So in a sense, the set of Kakas and Mancarella’s abductive explanations and that of
our minimal explanations are equivalent. However, as we have seen above, the number
of abductive explanations can be very large. Enumerating them all is impossible even in
simple, small domains. In contrast, the number of minimal explanations is much smaller.
More importantly, just like explanations in propositional logic, they only include “relevant
propositions”.
But computationally, it may be hard to compute minimal explanations from scratch. It
is often easier to compute first a small “cover” of all explanations.






where S0 is the set of minimal explanations of q .
Proposition 3.4. If S is a cover of q , then each α ∈ S must be an explanation of q .
Proof. If α′ is a completion of α, then α′ must be a completion of a minimal explanation
of q , so must be an explanation of q . So it follows from the definition that α is an
explanation. ✷
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So a cover is a set of explanations such that any complete explanation must be an
extension of one of the explanations in the cover. Once we have a cover, then we can
find all minimal explanations by propositional reasoning alone.
To that end, we first prove the following result:
Proposition 3.5. Let α be a hypothesis, and S a cover of q . We have that α |=∨β∈S β iff
α is an explanation of q .
Proof. Only if case: suppose α |=∨β∈S β . This means that any complete extension of α
must be an extension of one of the explanations in S , so an explanation of q . It follows
then that α is an explanation.
If case: if α is an explanation, and α′ a complete extension of it. Then α′ is an explanation.
So it must be an extension of a minimal explanation. Because S is a cover, so α′ must
entail one of the explanations in S . Thus α′ |=∨β∈S β . Since α′ is an arbitrary complete
extension of α, so α must entail
∨
β∈S β as well. ✷
Recall that a conjunction of literals α is a prime implicant of a formula ϕ if α |= ϕ, and
there is no other β such that β |= ϕ and β is a subset of α, i.e., α is a minimal conjunction
of literals that entails ϕ.
From the last proposition, we immediately have the following:
Proposition 3.6. Let S be a cover of q . Then a hypothesis is a minimal explanation of q iff
it is a prime implicant of ∨α∈S α.
4. Goal rewrite systems
Having defined the notion of abductive explanations and covers of a query, we now
consider the computational problem of how to actually generate them. To this end,
we shall formulate a goal-oriented proof procedure based on confluent and terminating
rewriting, and show that the procedure is sound and complete under the partial stable model
semantics. To simplify our presentation, we shall consider first the case where there are no
abducibles.
The idea of goal rewriting is simple. Given a program P , a completed definition
φ↔ B1∨· · ·∨Bn ∈ Comp(P ) can be used as a rewrite rule from left to right: φ is rewritten
to B1 ∨ · · · ∨ Bn, and ¬φ to ¬B1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Bn. We call these literal rewriting, and the
completed definitions program (rewrite) rules.
In general, a goal (formula) is just a formula in our propositional language. However,
in the following, all goals are assumed to be signed, which means that in these formulas,
negation occurs only in front of atoms.2 As we shall see, this restriction is necessary in
the rewrite rules that we have for handling loops. It is easy to see that we do not lose any
generality with this restriction as any goal can be equivalently transformed into a signed
goal using the following rewrite rules: for any formulas Φ and Ψ ,
2 The notion of signed goals was introduced in [19] for a similar purpose.
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¬¬Φ→Φ
¬(Φ ∨Ψ )→¬Φ ∧¬Ψ
¬(Φ ∧Ψ )→¬Φ ∨¬Ψ.
Note that, since we are dealing with partial stable models, 3-valued logic as introduced
in Section 2 will serve as the underlying logic in goal rewrite systems. For example, it
can be verified easily that the two sides of each rule above are logically equivalent under
3-valued logic.
In addition to program rules from Comp(P ) for literal rewriting, we also have the
following two types of rewrite rules:
• simplification rules to transform and simplify goals, and
• loop rules for handling loops.
We introduce these two types of rules in the next two subsections, following which goal
rewrite systems are defined and their properties investigated.
4.1. Simplification rules
The simplification subsystem is formulated with a mechanism of loop handling in mind,
which requires keeping track of literal sequences g0, . . . , gn that have been chosen for
rewriting, i.e., each gi , 0 < i  n, is in the goal formula resulted from rewriting gi−1.
These sequences are what we called rewrite chains below, and are checked for loops. In
addition to rewrite chains, we also need to keep track of the context when a literal is written
into T (tautology). This is necessary in order to maintain the consistency of a derivation:
For a conjunction to be provable, not only each conjunct needs to be proved, the contexts
under which these conjuncts are proved need to be consistent. These two notions are central
in formulating our goal rewrite systems, and are defined as follows:
• Rewrite Chain: Suppose a literal l is written by its definition φ ↔ Φ where l = φ
or l = ¬φ. Then, each literal l′ in Φ is generated in order to prove l. This ancestor-
descendant relation is denoted by l ≺ l′. A sequence l1 ≺ · · · ≺ ln is then called a
rewrite chain, abbreviated as l1 ≺+ ln. Notice that it is essential here that Φ be in the
form of a signed goal, and that when ¬p is in Φ , we have that l ≺¬p but not l ≺ p.
• Context: A rewrite chain g = g0 ≺ g1 ≺ · · · ≺ gn = T records a set of literals C =
{g0, . . . , gn−1} for proving g. We will write T ({g0, . . . , gn−1}) and call C a context.
For simplicity, we assume that whenever ¬F is generated, it is automatically replaced
by T (C), where C is the set of literals on the corresponding rewrite chain, and ¬T is
automatically replaced by F .
Note that for every literal in any derived goal, the rewrite chain leading to it from a literal
in the given goal is uniquely determined. As an example, suppose we have the following
equivalences: {a↔¬b ∧¬c, b↔ q ∨¬p}. We then have a rewrite sequence
a→¬b ∧¬c→¬q ∧ p ∧¬c.
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For the three literals in the last goal, we have the following rewrite chains from a:
a ≺¬b≺¬q, a ≺¬b≺ p, a ≺¬c.
A rewrite chain should not be confused with a rewrite sequence. The former describes
a dependency relationship between literals for book keeping purposes whereas the latter is
a sequence of rewrite steps between goal formulas.
Simplification Rules. Let Φi ’s be any goal formulas, C a context, and l a literal.
SR1. F ∨Φ→Φ .
SR1′. Φ ∨ F →Φ .
SR2. F ∧Φ→ F .
SR2′. Φ ∧ F → F .
SR3. T (C1)∧ T (C2)→ T (C1 ∪C2) if C1 ∪C2 is consistent.
SR4. T (C1)∧ T (C2)→ F if C1 ∪C2 is inconsistent.
SR5. T (C)∧ l→ F if ¬l ∈C.
SR5′. l ∧ T (C)→ F if ¬l ∈C.
SR6. Φ1 ∧ (Φ2 ∨Φ3)→ (Φ1 ∧Φ2)∨ (Φ1 ∧Φ3).
SR6′. (Φ1 ∨Φ2)∧Φ3 → (Φ1 ∧Φ3)∨ (Φ2 ∧Φ3).
The simplification system is a nondeterministic transformation system. The primed
version of a rule is its symmetric case. Rules SR1, SR1′, SR2, SR2′, SR6, and SR6′ are
about the logical equivalence between the two sides of a rule (in 2-valued as well as 3-
valued logic). SR3 merges two contexts if they are consistent, otherwise SR4 makes it a
failure to prove. SR5 and SR5′ prevent generating an inconsistent context before literal l is
even proved.
It can be seen intuitively that the effect of SR5 and SR5′ is similar to that of SR4. In
a sequential implementation, if no inconsistent literals are ever allowed by SR5 or SR5′
in individual steps, the condition for SR4 is never met, rendering SR4 redundant. On the
other hand, SR4 alone is sufficient to safeguard the consistency of generated contexts, and
it is not restricted to a sequential implementation. These rules represent different ways to
guarantee consistency providing flexibility for implementation.
Note that, in general, the proof-theoretic meaning of a goal formula may not be the same
as the logical meaning of the formula. For example, the goal formula a ∨¬a (a tautology
in classic logic) could well lead to an F if neither a nor ¬a can be proved.
For goal rewriting that does not involve loops, the system described so far is sufficient.
Example 4.1. Let P be
g← nota.
a← notb,notc. a← b,notd.
b← q. b← notp.
Then Comp(P ) is:
g↔¬a, a↔ (¬b ∧¬c)∨ (b ∧¬d), b↔ q ∨¬p,
q↔ F, p↔ F, d↔ F, c↔ F.
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The rewrite sequence below is generated by focusing on the beginning part of a goal.
g→¬a
→ (b ∨ c)∧ (¬b ∨ d)
→ (q ∨¬p ∨ c)∧ (¬b ∨ d)
→ (F ∨¬p ∨ c)∧ (¬b ∨ d)
→ (¬p ∨ c)∧ (¬b ∨ d)
→ (T (C)∨ c)∧ (¬b ∨ d) where C = {g,¬a, b,¬p}
→ (T (C)∧ (¬b ∨ d))∨ (c ∧ (¬b ∨ d))
→ (T (C)∧¬b)∨ (T (C)∧ d)∨ (c ∧ (¬b ∨ d)) % apply SR5
→ F ∨ (T (C)∧ d)∨ (c ∧ (¬b ∨ d))
→ (T (C)∧ d)∨ (c ∧ (¬b ∨ d))
→ (T (C)∧ F )∨ (c∧ (¬b ∨ d))
→ F ∨ (c∧ (¬b ∨ d))
→ c∧ (¬b ∨ d)
→ F ∧ (¬b ∨ d)
→ F.
4.2. Loop rules
After a literal l is rewritten, it is possible that at some later stage either l or ¬l appears
again in a goal on the same rewrite chain. Thus, a loop is a rewrite chain {l1, . . . , ln}
where l1 = ln, ln = ¬l1, or l1 = ¬ln. A loop analysis involves classifying all the cases of
loops, and for each one, determining the outcome of a rewrite according to the underlying
semantics.
To understand the effect of loop rules, it is convenient to construct a dependency graph
of a program: for each rule a ← b1, . . . , bm,notc1, . . . ,notcn in the program, there is
a positive edge from a to each bi , 1  i  m, and a negative edge from a to each cj ,
1 j  n.
For the problem at hand, there are only four cases of loops. When l1 =¬ln (or ln =¬l1),
the sign has changed from the beginning of the loop to the end. This loop yields a path from
l1 to l1 (or from ln to ln) in the program’s dependency graph that has an odd number of
negative edges. So we shall call them odd loops. Odd loops must fail as one cannot prove
a proposition by assuming its complement.
When l1 = ln, either every li , 1 < i < n, has the same sign as those of l1 and ln, or not.
When all li have the same sign, this sign is either positive or negative. They are identified as
two different cases here since they must be treated differently according to the semantics.
Otherwise, there is at least one li , 1 < i < n, whose sign differs from those of l1 and ln. In
this case, from the program’s dependency graph, a loop is formed that has an even number
of negative edges. In answer set programming, even loops are often used as a mechanism
to generate alternative candidate answer sets.
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Definition 4.2. Let S = l1 ≺+ ln be a rewrite chain.
• If ¬l1 = ln or l1 =¬ln, then S is called an odd loop.
• If l1 = ln, then
– S is called a positive loop if l1 and ln are both atoms and each literal on l1 ≺+ ln is
also an atom;
– S is called a negative loop if l1 and ln are both negative literals and each literal on
l1 ≺+ ln is also negative;
– Otherwise, S is called an even loop.
In all the cases above, ln is called a loop literal.
It turns out that we only need two rewrite rules to handle all four cases.
Loop Rules. Let g1 ≺+ gn be a rewrite chain.
LR1. gn→ F
if gi ≺+ gn, for some 1 i < n, is a positive loop or an odd loop.
LR2. gn→ T ({g1, . . . , gn})
if gi ≺+ gn, for some 1 i < n, is a negative loop or an even loop.
Apparently, a loop literal should always be rewritten by a loop rule. Our definition of a
rewrite sequence below will ensure that for each loop literal, there is exactly one loop rule
that can be applied to it.
Example 4.3. P1 = {b← notc. c← c.}. Below, b is proved due to a negative loop, and the
proof for ¬b is failed due to a positive loop:
b→¬c→¬c→ T ({b,¬c})
¬b→ c→ c→ F
P2 = {d← nota. a← notb. b← nota.}. Both d and ¬d are proved, due to an even loop
in either case:
d→¬a→ b→¬a→ T ({d,¬a, b})
¬d→ a→¬b→ a→ T ({¬d, a,¬b})
P3 = {a← notb. b← notb.}. Neither a nor ¬a is proved due to an odd loop:
a→¬b→ b→ F
¬a→ b→¬b→ F.
4.3. Goal rewrite systems and their properties
In this subsection, we show that the goal rewrite systems defined above are confluent
and terminating, and they are sound and complete under the partial stable model semantics.
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Consider a propositional language L that consists of a (finite or infinite) number of
propositions and their negative counterparts, all of which have been called literals, and
special symbols F and T (C) for each consistent set of literals C. Programs P in the
language and their completions Comp(P ) are defined as usual, with the exception that any
T appearing in Comp(P ) is replaced by T (∅). The set of goals QL consists of formulas
constructed inductively from literals and special symbols by ∨ and ∧. An initial goal, or
given goal, is one without special symbols.
A rewrite sequence is a sequence of zero or more rewrite steps Q0 → ·· · → Qk ,
denoted Q0 →∗ Qk , such that Q0 is an initial goal, and for each 0  i < k, Qi+1 is
obtained from Qi by
• literal rewriting at a non-loop literal in Qi , or
• applying a simplification rule to Qi or a subformula in Qi , or
• applying a loop rule to a loop literal in Qi .
Notice that since literal rewriting is done only on non-loop literals, once a loop is formed
during a rewriting process, it has to be eliminated by a loop rule. So it is not possible to
have a rewrite chain that contains more than one loop in any rewrite sequence.
Without loss of generality, we often assume that an initial goal is just a literal. In
addition, we may call a subsequence Qi →∗ Qk a rewrite sequence in the understanding
that it is part of some rewrite sequence Q0 →∗ Qi →∗ Qk from an initial goal Q0.
Definition 4.4. A goal rewrite system is a triple 〈QL,RP ,→〉, where QL is the set of all
goals, RP is a set of rewrite rules which consists of program rules from Comp(P ), the
simplification rules and the loop rules, and → is the set of all rewrite sequences.
Goal rewrite systems are like term rewriting systems [5] everywhere except at
terminating steps: a terminating step at a subgoal may depend on the history of rewriting.
A set of rewrite sequences defines a binary relation, say R, on the set of goal formulas:
R(Q,Q′) iff Q→∗ Q′. Hence, a set of rewrite sequences corresponds to a binary relation.
Two desirable properties of rewrite systems are the properties of termination and
confluence. Rewrite systems that possess both of these properties are called canonical
systems. A canonical system guarantees that the final result of rewriting from any given
goal is unique, independent of any order of rewriting.
Definition 4.5. A goal rewrite system 〈QL,RP ,→〉 is terminating iff there exists no
endless rewrite sequence Q1 →Q2 →Q3 → ·· · in →.
Definition 4.6. Given a goal rewrite system, a goal is called a normal form if it cannot be
rewritten by any rewrite rule.
Since the simplification system is terminating and literal rewriting only generates non-
repeated rewrite chains, it is clear that a goal rewrite system is terminating when the given
program is finite. Because any literal has a program rule in Comp(P ), no literal will appear
in any normal form. Furthermore, as the simplification system transforms a goal eventually
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to a disjunctive normal form (by SR6 and SR6′), goal rewriting always terminates at either
F , or T (C1) ∨ · · · ∨ T (Cm) for some m  1. The latter indicates one or more ways by
which the given goal is proved. We therefore have
Proposition 4.7. Let 〈QL,RP ,→〉 be a goal rewrite system. If P is finite then every rewrite
sequence in → is finite. Further, for any rewrite sequence Q0 →∗ Qk , if Qk is a normal
form, then either Qk = F or Qk = T (C1)∨ · · · ∨ T (Cm), for some m 1.
The confluence property is less obvious.
Definition 4.8. A goal rewrite system 〈QL,RP ,→〉 is confluent iff for any rewrite
sequences t1 →∗ t2 and t1 →∗ t3, there exist t4 ∈QL and rewrite sequences t2 →∗ t4 and
t3 →∗ t4.
Theorem 4.9. Any goal rewrite system 〈QL,RP ,→〉 with a finite P is confluent.
Since the techniques in proving this theorem are of little relevance to the rest of this
paper, we postpone the proof to Appendix A.
The next theorem states the soundness and completeness of goal rewrite systems.
Theorem 4.10. Let P be a finite program and 〈QL,RP ,→〉 a goal rewrite system.
Soundness: For any literal g and any rewrite sequence g→∗ T (C1) ∨ · · · ∨ T (Cm),
there exists a partial stable model Mi of P , for each i ∈ [1..m], such that g ∈Ci ⊆Mi .
Completeness: For any literal g true in a partial stable model M of P , there exists a
rewrite sequence g→∗ T (C1)∨· · ·∨T (Cm) such that there exists i ∈ [1..m], g ∈Ci ⊆M .
Intuitively, the soundness says that whenever a literal g is proved, there exists a partial
stable model containing g, and the completeness says that if g is true in one partial stable
model, then there always exists a demonstrating proof. Notice that since stable models
are a special case of partial stable models, this means that if g is true in some stable
model, then there is a proof of it in the rewrite system. However, the converse is not true
in general because stable model is a global notion and our rewrite system only checks
local consistency. We shall have more to say about this after we generalize the theorem to
include abducibles.
Before we prove the theorem, let’s discuss the relationship between goal rewriting and
derivability. Given a program P and a set of default negations ∆, P ∪∆ is viewed as a
positive program. By a derivation of an atom φ using program P , we mean the usual least
fixpoint construction of P ∪∆. In the following discussion, P refers to some fixed, finite
program, and 〈QL,RP ,→〉 is the goal rewrite system with respect to P . ∆ and ∆′ denote
sets of default negations.
We consider rewriting without using loop rules, in which case loop literals are just left
as terminating nodes. Any generated T (C) is viewed as a conjunction of the literals in C.
Goal rewriting in this case preserves logical equivalence under 2-valued as well as 3-valued
logic—any generated equivalence logically follows from Comp(P ). For this reason, we are
free to use ↔ to express a rewrite sequence generated without using loop rules.
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Suppose there are n rules in P with atom a as the head: a ← Bi,not_Ci , i ∈ [1..n]
(recall that Bi denotes the set of positive literals in the body and not_Ci the set of default
negations). The completion of a is then:
a↔ (B1 ∧¬C1)∨ · · · ∨ (Bn ∧¬Cn)
The disjunctive normal form (DNF) at the right hand side of ↔ describes all the possible
ways to derive a using program P . For negative literal ¬a, we have
¬a↔ (¬B1 ∨C1)∧ · · · ∧ (¬Bn ∨Cn)↔ Ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨Ψm
where each Ψj is a conjunction of n literals l1∧ · · ·∧ ln where li is taken from (¬Bi ∨Ci).
By the confluence property, such a DNF can always be obtained by repeatedly applying the
distribution rules SR6 and SR6′. Intuitively, such a DNF expresses that any possibility of
deriving a using P is blocked if we can demonstrate a derivation of each positive literal in
Ψj , and show that it is impossible to derive l for any negative literal ¬l in Ψj . In addition,
we must ensure the consistency of Ψj . Without it, blocking in the sense above is ineffective,
e.g., for the program {p← q. p← notq.}.
Since any literal l can be expressed equivalently by a DNF, l↔ Ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ψm, in the
following, we say that l is defined by Ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ψm (or, Ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ψm is the definition
of l).
Because of the termination and confluence properties, goal rewriting can be carried out
in any order. Here, we consider a particular order of rewriting under which the semantical
implications are easier to understand:
Repeatedly, perform a literal rewriting and then transform the derived
goal to a DNF.
Any T (C) in such a DNF is viewed as a conjunction of the literals in C. As an illustration,
suppose we have g↔ Ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ψm. Without loss of generality, suppose the next literal
rewriting takes place at l1 of Ψ1 = l1 ∧ · · · ∧ ln. Let the definition of l1 be Φ1 ∨ · · · ∨Φs .
We then get the next DNF
Ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨Ψm
↔
[




















∨Ψ2 ∨ · · · ∨Ψm.
Goal rewriting in this fashion terminates at a DNF where every literal therein is a loop
literal (after removing any disjunct that contains an F ). To complete the process, we only
need to apply loop rules, deal with conjunctive contexts according to simplification rules
SR3 and SR4, and remove any conjunction that contains an F according to rules SR1-2 and
SR1′-2′. Let us call such a DNF a pre-normal form. Clearly, a pre-normal form is unique.
Along with rewrite chains, a DNF represents a collection of derivation trees.
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Fig. 1. Derivation trees.
Definition 4.11. Let g be a literal, and g↔ Ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨Ψm be a rewrite sequence (without
using loop rules) where each Ψi , i ∈ [1..m], is a conjunction of literals and T (C)’s. The
derivation tree (d-tree for abbreviation) of Ψi is a tree with g as the root node, and literals
and T (C)’s in Ψi as the leaf nodes, where l′ is a child node of l iff l ≺ l′, or l′ = T (C) and
l→ T (C).
In a derivation tree, each branch from g to a leaf node l corresponds to the rewrite chain
of l. It’s called a derivation tree because the relation between a positive node p and the
collection of its child nodes Φ corresponds to a derivation of p, i.e., P ∪Φ+ ∪ΦN  p.
This derivation relation is transitive over positive literals. For a negative literal ¬p, the
collection of its child nodes Φ ′ expresses blocking of the derivation of p.
Note that a derivation tree of Ψi is unique, up to re-ordering of child nodes.
Example 4.12. Consider the following program:
g← d,not c. b← b.
c← notg,not e. e← e.
c← b. d.
The pre-normal form from g is generated as:
g↔ (T ({g,d})∧ g ∧¬b)∨ (T ({g,d})∧ e ∧¬b).
Fig. 1 depicts the two derivation trees of g, one for each conjunction in the pre-normal
form. For instance, the derivation tree at the left has two loop literals, one of which is on an
even loop and the other on a negative loop. After applying the loop rules, the tree at the left
produces T ({g,d,¬c,¬b}), whereas the one at the right generates an F , due to a positive
loop.
In the following, let g↔ Ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨Ψm→∗ T (D1)∨ · · ·∨ T (Ds) where Ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨Ψm
is a pre-normal form. Each Ψj , j ∈ [1..m], is reduced either to an F , or to a T (Di) if
each loop literal in Ψj is either on a negative loop or on an even loop, and the union of
all conjunctive contexts is consistent. Clearly, since some Ψj may have reduced to an F ,
we have s m. By the assumption of the above rewrite sequence, we know s  1. Now
suppose Ψj →∗ T (Di). We then have the following two lemmas.
Lemma 4.13. For each i ∈ [1..s], DNi ⊆ FP (DNi ), P ∪DNi  D+i , and P ∪ FP (DNi ) 
D+i .
Proof. Assume not ξ ∈DNi . Since Di is consistent, P ∪DNi  ξ , hence notξ ∈ FP (DNi ),
and DNi ⊆ FP (DNi ). It is clear that for any positive literal p in D+i , P ∪DNi  p, as, in
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the derivation tree of Ψj , every rewrite chain (branch) from p either ends at a T (C) where
C ⊆Di , or is supported by a negative literal ¬ξ for which not ξ ∈DNi , i.e., p ≺+ ¬ξ . It
then follows from DNi ⊆ FP (DNi ) that P ∪ FP (DNi )  p, for any positive literal p. ✷
Lemma 4.14. For each i ∈ [1..s], DNi ⊆ F 2P (DNi ).
Proof. Suppose there are n rules in P with atom a as the head: a←Bi,not_Ci , i ∈ [1..n].
For any nota ∈DNi , to show nota ∈ F 2P (DNi ), we need to show P ∪ FP (DNi )  a.
For any ∆ such that P ∪∆  a, consider any minimal ∆′ ⊆∆ such that P ∪∆′  a. ∆′
being minimal means that P ∪ (∆′ − {notξ})  a, for any notξ ∈ ∆′. Thus, each of such
∆′ corresponds to a particular derivation of a. Our goal is to show that for each of such ∆′,
there is at least one default negation not ξ ∈∆′ which is needed for the derivation of a but
is not in FP (DNi ).
It is clear that ∆′ = ∅, as otherwise P  a, and thus there exists a rewrite chain,
¬a ≺+ F , in the d-tree of Ψj , contradicting the assumption that Ψj →∗ T (Di).
Then, there is a derivation of a via some rule with a as the head relying on ∆′, say
a← Bk,not_Ck , such that ∆′ = not_Ck ∪∆′′ for some minimal ∆′′ satisfying P ∪∆′′ 
Bk . That ∆′ is non-empty implies either not_Ck is non-empty or ∆′′ is non-empty. Let the
definition of ¬a be Π1 ∨ · · · ∨Πs , where each Πj is of the form l1 ∧ · · · ∧ ln, and for each
i ∈ [1..n], li ∈ ¬Bi or li ∈ Ci . Consider the kth rule above with a as the head. If lk ∈ Ck ,
lk is positive and ¬a ≺ lk is in the d-tree of Ψj . Otherwise, lk is negative, say lk =¬b, and
lk ∈ ¬Bk . In this case, ¬a ≺¬b is in the d-tree of Ψj . By repeating the same argument for
¬b, and so on, since the d-tree of Ψj is finite, there are only two possibilities: every literal l
such that¬b ≺+ l is negative, or there exists a positive literal ξ such that¬b≺+ ξ . Clearly,
the former case implies P ∪∆′  b. This is a contradiction to P ∪∆′  Bk , where b ∈ Bk .
Otherwise, there exists a positive literal ξ such that ¬a ≺+ ξ . From Lemma 4.13, we know
P ∪DNi  ξ , hence notξ /∈ FP (DNi ). Since for each minimal ∆′ such that P ∪∆′  a,
there is at least one notξ ∈∆′ that is needed for the particular derivation of a but is not in
FP (D
N
i ), we conclude P ∪ FP (DNi )  a. This completes the proof. ✷
We are now ready to prove the soundness.
Proof of Soundness. Suppose g →∗ T (D1) ∨ · · · ∨ T (Dk). We show that, for each
i ∈ [1..k], Di can be extended to a partial stable model. We know DNi ⊆ FP (DNi )
(Lemma 4.13), and DNi ⊆ F 2P (DNi ) (Lemma 4.14). We also know that F 2P is monotonic
and FP is anti-monotonic (i.e., S1 ⊆ S2 implies FP (S1)⊇ FP (S2)). We therefore have the
following two sequences
DNi ⊆ F 2P
(
DNi




)⊇ F 3P (DNi )⊇ F 5P (DNi ) . . .
such that FkP (D
N
i )⊆ Fk+1P (DNi ), for any even number k  0, and FjP (DNi )⊆ Fj+1P (DNi ),
for any odd number j  1. Because P is finite, we can restrict the function FP to the
finite domain consisting of atoms appearing in P (any other atom in the underlying
language is false in any partial stable model). Thus, the two sequences above converge
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at FnP (D
N
i ), for some even number n 0, such that FnP (DNi )= Fn+2P (DNi ), Fn+1P (DNi )=
Fn+3P (D
N




i ) ⊆ Fn+1P (DNi ). By definition, the 3-valued interpretation M
that corresponds to the fixpoint FnP (D
N
i ), namely M
− = {¬φ | notφ ∈ FnP (DNi )} and
M+ = {φ | P ∪FnP (DNi )  φ}, is a partial stable model of P . ✷
We need the following lemma for the proof of completeness.
Lemma 4.15. A partial stable model M of a program P is a 3-valued model of Comp(P ).
Proof. For any atom a defined by a ← Bodyi , i ∈ [1..m], we show M satisfies its
completion: a↔ Body1 ∨ · · · ∨ Bodym. This can be proved by considering all three cases:
M(a)= t , M(a)= f , and M(a)= u. The first two cases are straightforward. For the last
case, since M is a model of P , we knowM(Bodyi ) = t , for any i . We show M(Bodyi )= u,
for some i . Now assumeM(Bodyi )= f for all i . We show that this leads to a contradiction.
Under this assumption, there is φ ∈ Bodyi such that M(φ) = f , for each i . φ is either
an atom or a default negation. Suppose φ is an atom. Then that M(φ) = f implies
notφ ∈ MN . Since M is a partial stable model of P , we have MN = F 2P (MN ) hence
notφ ∈ F 2P (MN ). By the definition of FP , we have P ∪ FP (MN )  φ. If φ is a default
negation notq , then M(q)= t hence P ∪MN  q . As a partial stable model, M satisfies
MN ⊆ FP (MN ). Thus, P ∪ FP (MN )  q . In either case, we have P ∪ FP (MN )  a
hence nota ∈ F 2P (MN ), i.e., nota ∈MN and ¬a ∈M . This contradicts the assumption
that M(a)= u. ✷
Proof of Completeness. Assume g ∈M for some partial stable modelM . By Lemma 4.15,
M is a 3-valued model of Comp(P ). Due to the confluence and termination properties, any
literal can be reduced to a pre-normal form such that the equivalence g↔ Ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨Ψm
logically follows from Comp(P ). Below, RC(Ψi) denotes the set of literals appearing on
the rewrite chains of the literals in Ψi (and is viewed as a conjunction when appropriate).
It follows from the transitivity of ↔ that the following are equivalent:
• M satisfies g;
• M satisfies RC(Ψ1)∨ · · · ∨ RC(Ψm);
• M satisfies some consistent RC(Ψi) (any inconsistent RC(Ψj ) can be removed);
• M satisfies some RC(Ψi) for which Ψi is odd-loop free (anyΨj on an odd loop implies
RC(Ψj ) is inconsistent).
Now suppose Ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨Ψm →∗ T (D1)∨ · · · ∨ T (Dm′). Then, M satisfies D1 ∨ · · · ∨
Dm′ ∨ U where U is the disjunction of those Ψj that are consistent (i.e., each RC(Ψj ) is
consistent) but on a positive loop. We are done if M satisfies D1 ∨ · · · ∨ Dm′ . Assume
M does not satisfy D1 ∨ · · · ∨Dm′ . Then M only satisfies U . Consider any Φ in U that
is satisfied by M . For any loop literal ξ in Φ , since ξ is on a positive loop, we know
P ∪RC(Φ)N  ξ . As M satisfies Φ , we have RC(Φ)⊆M , hence ξ ∈M and P ∪MN  ξ .
It follows there exists a ∆ such that ∆ ∪ RC(Φ)N ⊆MN and P ∪∆  ξ . That is, ξ can
be reduced, consistently with M , using an alternative rule with ξ as the head. From the
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definition of ξ , we know that no possibility of deriving ξ is missed. As each loop literal
in Φ can be extended this way, we can replace the derivations from (the first occurrences
of) such loop literals by these alternatives. Let Φ ′ be the conjunction whose d-tree is that
of Φ except the derivations from such literals are removed. Then, there exists a rewrite
sequence Φ ′ →∗ Ψ ′ such that Ψ ′ is in the pre-normal form and not on a positive loop,
and RC(Ψ ′) is consistent due to RC(Ψ ′) ⊆M . Thus, Ψ ′ →∗ T (C) where C = RC(Ψ ′).
Therefore, T (C) must be one of the T (Di). This contradicts the assumption that M does
not satisfy D1 ∨ · · · ∨Dm′ . We are done. ✷
A partial stable modelM is maximal if there is no other partial stable modelM ′ such that
M ⊂M ′. Maximal partial stable models minimize the undefined. A stable model is clearly
a maximal partial stable model that has no undefined. Maximal partial stable models are
also known as regular models and preferred extensions [6,31,37]. Clearly, any literal g is
true in a partial stable model if and only if g is true in a maximal partial stable model. We
therefore have
Corollary 4.16. Goal rewrite systems are sound and complete with respect to the regular
model semantics.
4.4. Rewriting with non-ground programs
The rewriting framework introduced here is defined for ground programs. It however
can be applied to function-free programs for proving ground goals. In abduction,
observations are usually formulated as ground goals. The idea is that if every derived goal
is ground, then all the mechanisms given in this paper become applicable by adding an
unification algorithm (in fact, a simple instantiation process is sufficient). Obviously, if for
every rule in the given program a variable that appears in the body also appears in the head,
then a ground goal will be rewritten to another ground goal.
One class of programs that can easily satisfy this property is the so-called domain
restricted programs [27]. The idea of domain restriction is that if every variable that
appears in a rule appears in a positive body literal of the rule, and draws its value from
a finite domain, then the instantiation of the rule can be restricted to these domain values.
The interest in [27] is to instantiate a function-free program to a possibly smaller ground
program while preserving the stable model semantics. For our purpose of non-ground
rewriting over ground goals, a rule can be instantiated only on domain predicates for
variables that do not appear in the head. For example, to describe the reachability from
a node s in a graph we may write
reached(U)← arc(s,U).
reached(U)← arc(V ,U), reached(V ).
along with some facts about the predicate arc(X,Y ), which can be considered a domain
predicate. Since in the second rule the variable V appears only in the body, we instantiate
the rule to
reached(U)← arc(ai,U), reached(ai).
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for each node ai such that arc(ai,U) is true for some U . Suppose there are n such nodes
a1, . . . , an. Then, the completion of the predicate reached is:
reached(X)↔
arc(s,X)∨ [arc(a1,X)∧ reached(a1)]∨ · · · ∨ [arc(an,X)∧ reached(an)].
Thus, a ground goal, say reached(t) (to prove that t can be reached from s), is always
rewritten to another ground goal.
5. Rewrite systems for abduction
The rewriting framework that we defined in the preceding section can be extended for
abduction in a straightforward way: the only difference in the extended framework is that
we do not apply the Clark completion to abducibles. That is, once an abducible appears in
a goal, it will remain there unless it is eliminated by the simplification rule SR2 or SR2′.
Just like a rewrite to T is written as T (C), where C is the underlying rewrite chain
(cf. Section 4.1), a rewrite to an abducible literal l will be written as l(C) where C is the
rewrite chain leading to, including l. Thus when we write l(C), it is understood that C
always contains l.
An abducible may appear in a goal positively or negatively, we thus need a terminology
to refer to both of them: an abducible literal is either an abducible φ or its negative
counterpart ¬φ.
In the following we shall denote by 〈QL,RP ,A,→〉 the rewrite system obtained by the
logic program P and the set A of abducibles. These rewrite systems are both sound and
complete with respect to the partial stable models semantics.
Theorem 5.1. Let P be a finite program, A a set of propositions, and 〈QL,RP ,A,→〉 the
goal rewrite system with respect to P and A.
Soundness: For any literal g and any rewrite sequence
g→∗ G∨ [l1(C1)∧ · · · ∧ lk(Ck)]∨G′,
where each li is either an abducible literal or T , if C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ck is consistent, then there
exists a partial stable model M of P ∪ {l1, . . . , lk}+ such that g ∈⋃1jk Ci ⊆M .
Completeness: For any set of atoms S ⊆ A, and any literal g in a partial stable model
M of P ∪ S, there exists a rewrite sequence
g→∗ G∨ [l1(C1)∧ · · · ∧ lk(Ck)]∨G′,
such that g ∈⋃1jk Cj ⊆M .
Proof. Since none of the abducibles appear in the head of any program rule, the statements
here about soundness and completeness follow directly from those of Theorem 4.10. ✷
We have again stated our results in terms of the partial stable model semantics. Again
the reason that our rewriting system may not be sound under the stable model semantics
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is that stable models check for global consistency, but our system checks only local ones.
There are several ways to make the rewriting system also sound and complete for stable
models. When a conjunction of abducibles
l1(C1)∧ · · · ∧ lk(Ck)
is generated, one can check if C = C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ck is consistent and complete. If it is, then
{l1, . . . , lk} is an explanation. If it is consistent but not complete, then we can either call a
stable model generator to see if C can be extended to a stable model or we can choose an
atom p such that neither it nor its negation is in C, and continue the rewriting with either
p(C) or ¬p(C), until a complete context is obtained.
There is however an important special class of logic programs where partial stable
models and stable models coincide. We say that a program has no odd loops (odd-loop free)
if there is no odd loop starting with any literal. Since goal rewrite systems are confluent,
any odd-loop in the program’s dependency graph can replicate itself in a rewrite chain of
some goal rewrite sequence. Therefore, there is no essential difference between our notion
of odd-loop free and the notion of negative cycle free in the literature [8,32].
It has been shown in [36] that for any nonground, negative cycle free program with a
well-founded stratification, its partial stable models are all 2-valued and thus coincide with
its stable models.3 A stratification in this case is a partial order of strata each of which
contains ground atoms that are involved in some loops among themselves. In a well-
founded stratification, there is no infinite descending chain in the partial order. That is,
every such chain must have a base stratum.4 This property allows us to construct, along the
well-founded stratification in the bottom-up fashion, a 2-valued justifiable model (which is
known to be a stable model) from any 3-valued justifiable model. In this way one can show
there is no partial stable model with undefined atoms. Since finite propositional programs
all have a well-founded stratification, for these programs our rewriting system becomes
sound and complete under the stable model semantics. We thus have the following results.
Theorem 5.2. Let P be a finite program, and 〈QL,RP ,A,→〉 a goal rewrite system.
Suppose q is a proposition and
q→∗ [l11(C11)∧ · · · ∧ l1k1(C1k1)]∨ · · · ∨ [lm1(Cm1)∧ · · · ∧ lmkm(Cmkm)]
is a rewrite sequence such that each lij is either T or an abducible literal, and Ci1 ∪ · · · ∪
Ciki is consistent for each i . If P has no odd loops then{{l11, . . . , l1k1}, . . . , {lm1, . . . , lmkm}}
is a cover of q . In general, for arbitrary P we have∨
α∈S
α ⊃ [l11 ∧ · · · ∧ l1k1] ∨ · · · ∨ [lm1 ∧ · · · ∧ lmkm ]
where S is any cover of q .
3 The result was stated for maximal partial stable models. However, the claim can be extended to all partial
stable models by exactly the same proof.
4 Here is a program that has no well-founded stratification: {p(a). p(x)← notp(f (x)).}.
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Proof. We show that for each i , {li1, . . . , liki } is an explanation of q . Let’s denote the set
by α, and let β be any complete hypothesis that extends α. We need to show that there is
an answer set of P ∪ β+ that includes q . (Notice again that we have assumed that none of
the propositions in A appear in the head of any rule in P .) Since there is a rewrite sequence
of the form:
q→∗ G∨ [li1(Ci1)∧ · · · ∧ liki (Ciki )]∨G′
in 〈QL,RP ,A,→〉, there is a rewrite sequence of the form q →∗ T (C) ∨ G in 〈QL,
RP∪β+,→〉, where
C = Ci1 ∪ · · · ∪Ciki ,
because Ci1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ciki is consistent, and {li1, . . . , liki } is a subset of β . Thus by
Theorem 4.10, there is a partial stable model M of P ∪ β+ such that q ∈M . Now since
P does not have any odd loops, neither does P ∪ β+. So M+ is an answer set of P ∪ β+.
This shows that β is an explanation of q . So α is an explanation.
Now let β be any complete explanation of q . We need to show that for some i ,
{li1, . . . , liki } is a subset of β . Let M be an answer set of P ∪ β+ that includes q .
By Theorem 4.10, there is a rewrite sequence of the form q →∗ T (C) ∨ G in
〈QL,RP∪β+,→〉. Then there must be a rewrite sequence of the form: q →∗ [l1(C1) ∧
· · · ∧ lj (Cj )] ∨G′ in 〈QL,RP ,A,→〉 such that {l1, . . . , lj } ⊆ T ∩ β , and C1, . . . ,Cj are
consistent. So by Theorem 4.9, it must be the case that
l1 ∧ · · · ∧ lj  [l11 ∧ · · · ∧ l1k1] ∨ · · · ∨ [lm1 ∧ · · · ∧ lmkm ]
in propositional logic. But {l1, . . . , lj } is contained in β , which is a complete hypothesis,
so there must be an i such that β |= li1 ∧ · · · ∧ liki . ✷
Consider again the boat example in Section 1. The Clark completion of canCross is:
canCross≡ (boat∧¬leak)∨ (boat∧ leak∧ hasBucket).
Since boat, leak and hasBucket are abducibles, rewriting for canCross terminates in one
step, and produces the following cover:
{boat∧¬leak, boat∧ leak∧ hasBucket}.
Notice that the second explanation is not minimal. To get minimal ones, we have to
compute prime implicants of the disjunction of explanations in the cover, which are
boat∧¬leak and boat∧ hasBucket.
6. Related work
Traditionally, logic programming proof procedures have been defined abstractly
in terms of derivation and refutation. Termination has been considered a separate,
implementation issue. On the one hand, this separation is possible since the semantics
that these procedures compute allow the completeness to be stated without resorting
to termination. But completeness is rarely guaranteed in an implementation. On the
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other hand, the separation is also necessary since these procedures deal with non-ground
programs for which the problem of loop-checking is undecidable (even for function-free
programs [1]). However, for answer set programming where each answer set is taken as
a solution to a given problem, loop handling becomes a semantic issue—a sound and
complete backward chaining procedure cannot be defined without it.
A number of abductive procedures have been proposed for the two-valued as well
as three-valued completion semantics [3,4,9], of which the system by Console et al.
[3] and the IFF procedure by Fung and Kowalski [9] also use rewriting as the main
mechanism to compute explanations. Console et al. show that, for non-recursive programs
(called hierarchical programs), abductive explanations can be computed as a deduction by
rewriting using iff-definitions. Fung and Kowalski extend this idea to the class of all normal
programs, and get completeness results that can be stated without resorting to termination.
This improves the completeness theorems by Denecker and De Schreye [4] which rely on
termination as a condition. All of these procedures are defined for cautious reasoning—
computing bindings for which an (existential) goal is true in all indented models. In our
case the reasoning mode is brave—establishing whether a query is true in one of the
intended models. For example, with the program {a← notb. b← nota.}, the answer to
query a should be no in their case (however, none of these procedures actually terminates
and returns this answer), and true in a stable model in our case. Apparently, the differences
between the proof methods for consequence finding and those for brave reasoning lie in
the correct handling of loops in the latter in order to capture each of the intended models.
Our work is closely related to another abductive procedure, the Eshghi–Kowalski
procedure (EKP) [7] (also see [6]), which is sound and complete for ground programs
under the finite-failure three-valued stable model semantics in which loops causing infinite
failure are modeled by the truth value undefined [12]. It is known that with an appropriate
handling of positive loops (distinguished as positive and negative loops in this paper), EKP
can be made complete for the partial stable model semantics. To some extent, one can say
that our goal rewriting system (GRS) simulates EKP in a nontrivial way.
1. GRS incurs no backtracking! Backtracking is simulated by rewriting disjunctions, e.g.,
F ∨Φ→Φ .
2. Loops that go through negation are handled in EKP by nested structures while in GRS
by a flat structure using rewrite chains.
These features plus loop handling made it possible to formalize our system as a rewriting
system benefiting from the known properties of rewrite systems in the literature. (This
further distinguishes our use of rewrite systems from the literature, e.g., in [9].) To illustrate
these features, consider the following program
r1. g← nota. r3. b← a.
r2. a← notb,notc. r4. c← a.
and the question whether we can prove g. We may answer this question by the following
reasoning: To have g we must have nota (r1); to have nota we must have either b or c (r2)
which requires having a (r3 and r4). This results in a contradiction. Therefore, g cannot
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be proved. Note that in this reasoning we need to remember what was required previously
(nota in this case). This is exactly how the proof is done by GRS:
g→¬a→ b ∨ c→ a ∨ c→ F ∨ c→ c→ a→ F.
However, EKP will go through six nested levels, and do it twice through backtracking,
before the same conclusion can be reached. That a single derivation branch in EKP
could be deeply nested brings no surprise that any attempt to lay out a proof presents
some challenge, even for small programs. We note that the mechanism of rewrite chain
is indispensable in any implementation of a top-down procedure if termination and
completeness are to be preserved. For GRS, such a mechanism is used both for termination
and for the implementation of the semantics, resulting in a much simpler yet more natural
proof structure.
Our goal rewriting procedure departures from the traditional SLDNF-like procedures
also in the use of a computational rule. Recall that a computational rule is a function
that returns a subgoal form a goal. Its interest originates from the so called independence
of computational rules for Horn clause programs, which says that the commitment to any
subgoal can be made without the need of looking back, because no solutions will be missed.
For normal programs, such a computational rule must be fair which requires generation of
an SLD-tree that is either finite, or every subgoal in it is eventually selected [25]. These
conditions require a fair computation rule to be implemented by a form of breadth-first
search in order to find a finitely failed tree. In contrast, since goal rewrite systems are
confluent and terminating, literal selection can be arbitrary and is guaranteed to be fair. As
an example, consider the following program:
g← nota.
a← notb,notc. a← notd.
b← notd. d← not e.
e← notd. c.
The program has two stable models, {c, e, a} and {a, b, c, e}. A complete procedure for
brave reasoning should generate a proof for g. Such a proof is reflected naturally, and
logically, in goal rewriting
g→¬a→ (b ∨ c)∧ d→ (¬d ∨ c)∧ d→ ·· · .
Any of the literals in the last goal above can be selected for literal rewriting, or the goal
can be transformed to (¬d ∧ d)∨ (c∧ d). Even if we can prove¬d , its conflict with d will
fail this alternative.5 Thus (¬d ∧ d)∨ (c ∧ d) will be rewritten to F ∨ (c ∧ d) and then to
(c ∧ d). Continuing, we have
5 As a technical note, this example also explains why in general we cannot have a rewrite rule of the form
T (C)∨Φ→ T (C), even if we content with one proof.
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→ c∧ d
→ T ({g,¬a, c})∧ d
→ T ({g,¬a, c})∧¬e
→ T ({g,¬a, c})∧ d
→ T ({g,¬a, c})∧ T ({g,¬a, d,¬e})
→ T ({g,¬a, c, d,¬e}).
In an SLDNF-procedure, for instance, in the Eshghi–Kowalski procedure, to prove g
we need to prove that any attempt to prove a fails. The two possibilities of proving a are
kept in a goal set {← notb,notc; ← notd}. Both should fail in order for g to succeed.
From the first goal, suppose we choose notb. To fail this goal, we can get a derivation of b
using notd ; so far we have succeeded in choosing notb for the current goal. However, this
proof causes a conflict in order to fail the second goal by proving d . Thus, the choice of
notb in the first goal does not give us a proof that both goals fail. In fact, we must choose
notc in the first goal in order to fail both. Since in general we do not know which subgoal
leads to a proof, if a procedure is non-terminating, a fair computational rule must explore
all alternatives in an interleaving fashion in order not to miss an answer to a query.
7. Applications and experimental results
We have implemented the writing framework in SWI-Prolog. Our implementation
adopts a strategy based on eager literal rewriting and lazy expansion, which resembles
the familiar depth-first strategy. The main idea is to delay applying distribution rules SR6
and SR6′ as much as possible to avoid an exponential blow up in goal size. We thus fix the
order of rewriting by focusing on the leftmost literal of a goal. We say that a literal l in a
goal Q is rewritable (for literal rewriting) if it is either at the leftmost position of Q, or at
the second leftmost position with a conjunct T (C) at the left where l is not a loop literal
and neither l nor¬l is in C. That is, a literal l is rewritable only in goals that begin with one
of the three forms: l ∨Φ , l ∧Φ , and T (C)∧ l, where Φ is a formula. If l is a loop literal
then a loop rule is applied; if ¬l ∈C then rule SR5 is applied to produce an F ; if l ∈C, l is
already proved, thus the rewrite chain of l is merged with C. Being lazy means that a goal
is simplified only when doing so is necessary to make the goal rewritable. In particular,
the distribution rules SR6 and SR6′ will be applied only when a goal is not rewritable, and
none of the above applies.
Under this strategy, we keep rewriting the literal at the leftmost position of a goal.
Eventually, it will become an F or a T (C). If it is a T (C), we will keep rewriting
the leftmost literal l in conjunction with T (C), during which ¬l ∈ C is checked for
consistency. When this l is rewritten to T (C′), C and C′ are merged; and recursively,
we continue to focus on the literal at the leftmost position of the goal, or the one in
conjunction with T (C ∪C′). The reader may refer to the rewrite sequence in Example 4.1
as an example, which is generated using this strategy.
200 F. Lin, J.-H. You / Artificial Intelligence 140 (2002) 175–205
In our current implementation, the input is required to be a set of Clark completion
sentences, one for each non-abducible proposition. In the following, we discuss the
performance of our implementation on one particular application of abduction in logic
programming, which is the problem of computing successor state axioms from a causal
action theory [22–24].
Consider a logistics domain in which we have a truck and a package. We know that the
truck and the package can each be at only one location at any given time, and that if the
package is in the truck, then when the truck moves to a new location, so is the package.
Suppose that we have the following propositions:
• ta(x)—the truck is at location x initially;
• pa(x)—the package is at location x initially;
• in—the package is in the truck initially;
• ta(x, y, z)—the truck is at location x after the action of moving it from y to z is
performed;
• pa(x, y, z)—the package is at location x after the action of moving the truck from y to
z is performed; and
• in(y, z)—the package is in the truck after the action of moving the truck from y to z is
performed.
We then have the following logic program:
ta(X,X1,X).
pa(X,X1,X2)← ta(X,X1,X2), in(X1,X2).
ta(X,X1,X2)←X =X2, ta(X),not taol(X,X1,X2).




The first rule is the effect axiom. The second rule is a causal rule which says that if a
package is in the truck, then the package should be where the truck is. The rest are frame
axioms. For instance, the third one is the frame axiom about ta, with the help of a new
predicate taol: if the truck is initially at X, and if one cannot prove that it will be elsewhere
after the action is performed, then it should still be at X.
As one can see, the above program, when fully instantiated over any given finite set D
of locations, has no odd loops. So our rewrite system will generate a cover for any query.
Note that in the program we have omitted domain predicate loc(X) for each variable X in
the body of a rule (all the variables in the program refer to locations). Thus, the program
is domain restricted, and we only need to instantiate the variable Y in the fourth and sixth
rules over the domain of locations.
Now let the set A of abducibles be the following set:
{in} ∪ {pa(x), ta(x) | x ∈D}.
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¬pa(1,2,3) ¬pa(1)∨ in∨ pa(2)∨ pa(3)∨ pa(4) 0.2
pa(2,2,3) pa(2)∧¬in 0.08
¬pa(2,2,3) ¬pa(2)∨ in∨ pa(1)∨ pa(3)∨ pa(4) 0.1
pa(3,2,3) pa(3)∨ in 0.25
¬pa(3,2,3) ¬in∧¬pa(3)∨¬in∧ pa(1)∨
¬in∧ pa(2)∨¬in∧ pa(4) 0.1
For instance, the row on pa(1,2,3) says that for it to be true, the package must initially be
at 1 and cannot be inside the truck (otherwise, it would be moved along with the truck),
and the computation took 0.05 seconds. The row on pa(3,2,3) says that for it to be true,
either the package was initially at 3 or it was inside the truck. The outputs for larger Ds are
similar. The performance varies for different queries. For simple queries like ta(1,2,3),
their covers can be computed almost in constant time. The hardest one is for pa(3,2,3)
which took 25 minutes when |D| = 7.
It is interesting to compare our system with an alternative for computing the cover of a
query. As we mentioned in Section 3, the set of abductive explanations according to Kakas
and Mancarella is actually a cover. One way of computing these abductive explanations
is to add, for each proposition p ∈ A, the following two clauses [33]: p← not¬p and
¬p← notp into the original program, and use the fact that there will be a one to one
correspondence between abductive explanations of q under the original program and
answer sets of the new program that contain q . So one can use an answer set generator, for
example smodels [35] or dlv [20] to compute a cover of query by generating all the answer
sets in the new program that contain the query. However, the problem here is that there are
too many such answer sets in this case. For instance, suppose there are n locations, then the
number of answer sets that contain any particular query is in the order of 22n, roughly one
half of the number of complete hypotheses, even for a very simple query like ta(1,2,3).
We do not know at the moment if there is any efficient way of using an answer set generator
to compute a cover set of a query.
8. Final remarks
Without the minimality requirement, a sound and complete procedure for abduction
is required to generate sometimes a large amount of essentially redundant explanations.
In this paper, we have given a new definition of abduction for logic programming that
resolves this problem. In practice, for efficiency reasons one need not always compute the
6 On a PIII 1 GHz PC with 512 MB RAM running SWI-Prolog 3.2.9.
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set of minimal explanations, but a cover, which may be considered a semantically adequate
representation of all explanations.
Computationally, we have shown that explanations can be computed by confluent
and terminating rewriting. On the one hand, our work explores the well-understood
relationships among the completion semantics, the partial stable model semantics, and
the answer set semantics. On the other hand, we combine several ideas that had only
been studied previously in separate contexts. Namely, we build loop checking into rewrite
systems that implement the completion semantics to obtain an abductive procedure for the
partial stable model semantics.
There are several directions for extending this work. One of them is to consider rewriting
for non-ground programs for some restricted yet decidable classes of non-ground goals.
This would extend our rewriting procedure to a more general query-answering procedure
for wider classes of applications. Another question is on the handling of constraints of the
form:
⊥← a1, . . . , ai,notb1, . . . ,notbn.
Our new definition of abduction can be extended to include these constraints straightfor-
wardly. Computationally, constraints may be handled in our rewriting procedure just like
in other abductive procedures [4,9,16]: a goal is proved along with all the constraints. This
ensures that all of the constraints are satisfied when the goal is proved. This approach ac-
tually produces a new semantics: partial stable model semantics with constraints. This is
distinguished from the partial stable model semantics because a normal program under this
new semantics is no longer guaranteed a partial stable model. The semantical implications
of partial stable models with constraints worth further study.
To improve the efficiency of the goal rewriting procedure, space pruning techniques
shall be investigated and incorporated. Scalability may be improved by considering
different strategies of maintaining a goal so that the run time space usage can be reduced.
For example, one possible strategy is not to expand a goal using the distribution rules SR6
and SR6′; instead, a collection of literals from the goal is selected, one at a time, that
corresponds to a candidate solution. This requires book keeping mechanisms that should
be closely related to maintaining backtrack points in implementing Prolog languages.
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Appendix A
We prove that a goal rewrite system with a finite program is confluent. It is known in
the literature [13] that, a terminating rewrite relation is confluent iff it is locally confluent.
Local confluence is defined as: whenever t1 → t2 and t1 → t3, there exist t4 and rewrite
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sequences such that t2 →∗ t4 and t3 →∗ t4. It therefore suffices to show the property of
local confluence.
Theorem A.1. Any goal rewrite system 〈QL,RP ,→〉 with a finite P is locally confluent.
We introduce some notations.
A goal formula is viewed as a tree. A subformula is identified by a sequence of positive
integers describing the path from the root symbol to the head of the subformula. These
sequences are called indices. That an index ω identifies a subformula Φ is expressed by a
mapping m(ω)=Φ . The empty sequence identifies the formula itself. For example, given
(l1 ∨ l2)∧ l3, we have m(1)= l1 ∨ l2, and m(1.2)= l2.
A rewrite sequence of zero or more steps is denoted as Q0 →∗ Qk . When we are
interested in where in a given goal Qi a rewrite occurs and which rule is applied, we
write Qi →ω,r Qi+1 to indicate that rule r is applied to the subformula at index ω.
Proof. Let Q0 →∗ Qk be a rewrite sequence, where k  0. Suppose Qk →ω,r N and
Qk →ω′,r ′ N ′. We consider all the cases of possibly different rewrites on Qk .
If the two rewrite steps are independent of each other, i.e., if their indices are
non-overlapping, then trivially, there exists a formula M such that N →ω′,r ′ M and
N ′ →ω,r M .
The following are the overlapping cases.
Case 1. A loop rewrite at m(ω) = l and a rewrite by SR5 at m(ω′) = T (C) ∧ l (the
symmetric case of a rewrite by SR5′ is similar). Using SR5 followed by SR2, we have
T (C) ∧ l→ F ∧ l→ F . That is, an F is generated at ω′. A loop rule produces either an
F , in which case we have T (C)∧F → F so that an F is at ω′, or T (C′) for some C′ at ω.
The latter leads to T (C)∧ T (C′)→ F due to l ∈C′ and ¬l ∈C, so that at ω′ is also an F .
Case 2. Literal rewriting at m(ω) = l and a rewrite by SR5 at m(ω′) = T (C) ∧ l (the
symmetric case of a rewrite by SR5′ is similar). Again SR5 leads to an F at ω′. Since P
is finite, it follows from Proposition 4.7 that the sequence terminates at either an F , or a
T (C1)∨ · · · ∨ T (Cm) for some m 1. Hence, there exists an extension from Qk →ω,r N ,
say Qk →ω,r M →∗ M ′ such that M ′ is the same as M except at ω, m(ω) = F or
m(ω)= T (C1)∨ · · · ∨ T (Cm), for some m 1. That is, at ω′ we have either T (C)∧F , or
T (C) ∧ (T (C1) ∨ · · · ∨ T (Cm)) where ¬l ∈ C and l ∈ Ci for each 1  i m. Clearly, in
either case, the rewrite sequence can be extended to lead to an F at ω′.
Case 3. Any rewrite inside a subformula that is distributed by SR6 (the symmetric case
is similar). SR6 is Φ1∧ (Φ2∨Φ3)→ (Φ1 ∧Φ2)∨ (Φ1∧Φ3). Any rewrite at a subformula
inside Φ1 ∧ (Φ2 ∨Φ3) causes overlapping. Clearly, distribution after the rewrite and the
rewrite (or the duplicated rewrites if inside Φ1) after distribution lead to the same result.
Note that distribution does not change a rewrite chain for any literal; it simply duplicates
the rewrite chain for each occurrence of the same literal.
Case 4. A rule overlaps with its symmetric counterpart. This includes the following
cases of a rule and its symmetric counterpart both being applicable: SR1 and SR1′ for goal
F ∨ F , SR2 and SR2′ for goal F ∧ F , and SR6 and SR6′ for goal Ψ1 ∧Ψ2 where each Ψi
is a disjunction. Clearly, in each case, there exist rewrite sequences leading to a common
goal. ✷
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